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Abstract
The key contribution of this work is to introduce a mathematical framework to understand self-organized dynamics in the
brain that can explain certain aspects of itinerant behavior. Specifically, we introduce a model based upon the coupling of
generalized Lotka-Volterra systems. This coupling is based upon competition for common resources. The system can be
regarded as a normal or canonical form for any distributed system that shows self-organized dynamics that entail winnerless
competition. Crucially, we will show that some of the fundamental instabilities that arise in these coupled systems are
remarkably similar to endogenous activity seen in the brain (using EEG and fMRI). Furthermore, by changing a small subset
of the system’s parameters we can produce bifurcations and metastable sequential dynamics changing, which bear a
remarkable similarity to pathological brain states seen in psychiatry. In what follows, we will consider the coupling of two
macroscopic modes of brain activity, which, in a purely descriptive fashion, we will label as cognitive and emotional modes.
Our aim is to examine the dynamical structures that emerge when coupling these two modes and relate them tentatively to
brain activity in normal and non-normal states.
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Introduction
The view that the brain is an active system that entails the
acquisition and maintenance of information for responding to
environmental events has a long history [1–4]. On a coarse grain
level of description, mental brain activity can be represented by a
dynamical model as the activity of a complex nonequilibrium
system [5,6]. In spite of the fact that the brain is a noisy place, i.e.,
individual responses of single neurons to stimuli are highly
variable, the cooperative activity of a large number of neurons is
robust against noise and reproducible [6,7]. The principles of
mental activity and, in particular those regarding the cognition-
emotion interaction that we are going to discuss in this paper, are
based on experimental observations supporting the following
statement: the human brain is intrinsically organized into active,
interactive functional networks and its effective coarse grain
activity can be described by a dynamical model.
Traditional efforts in modeling dynamical phenomena in the
brain are predominantly based on the premise that dynamical
systems tend to converge to stable fixed points or dynamical states
(limit cycles or strange attractors) where the density of all flows
(matter, energy, or information) are balanced and do not change
(see, for example, [8]). Active neuronal networks in some specific
conditions - (with symmetric reciprocal interactions) give rise to a
convergent mental activity involving multiple attractors [9,10].
There may be some cognitive activities, such as associative
memory [11], which fits the attractor-oriented description.
However, mental computing with attractors generally limits the
use of complex dynamical networks. Once the attractor (or its
vicinity) is reached, the ‘‘dynamical’’ nature of the brain becomes
irrelevant; therefore, when attractors mark the terminal states of
mental process, this behavior could be formulated equally
effectively by an algebraic cause-response mapping. Furthermore,
this scheme overlooks the qualities of the (transient) path from the
initial condition to the attractor, an important phase where the
brain could exploit its remarkable repertoire of behaviors. Thus,
confining dynamical models of the brain with global and
symmetric coupling is not only unrealistic, but also rules out a
continuum of opportunities for modeling and understanding
mental activity. In this paper, we propose an alternative paradigm,
i.e., stable transient dynamics, which can be implemented in the
realistic case of non-symmetric connections between interacting
mental agents.
One of the most intriguing components of mental transients is
the metastable state, which provides the structural stability of
transient behavior [12]. Metastability is a system-level phenom-
enon, which is becoming increasingly popular in neuroscience for
the elucidation of human information processing and pattern
recognition. Metastability imposes semi-transient signals in the
brain, which persist briefly and differ from the usual equilibrium
state [13]. The metastable activity of the cortex can also be
inferred from behavior [14]. Metastability is a principle that
describes the brain’s ability to make sense out of seemingly
random environmental cues [15,16]. The existence of mental
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diverse brain centers or neuron groups [17–21], is the result of self-
organization in very complex neuronal systems. The temporal
order of metastable states is determined by the functional
connectivity of the underlying networks and their causality
structure [22]. The mathematical image of a metastable state is
a saddle set in the working (state) space of the brain; the transition
between these saddles occurs via unstable separatrices connecting
them (see Fig. 1). There is a substantial experimental support
[13,23,24] (also outlined below) that metastability and transient
dynamics are key phenomena in brain dynamics.
Neuroimaging and multi-electrode recording experiments
reported in the last decades have shown that various brain
functions and psychiatric disorders are represented by different
spatio-temporal brain activity patterns. Such patterns are a
sequence of metastable states. Each metastable state is the result
of a coordinated interaction between emotional, cognitive and
perceptional modes; that is, a set of neuronal groups in different
parts of the brain, which are self-organized for the execution of a
specific mental function. The modes interact with each other
according to the following general principles: (1) they compete for
limited mental resources (attention, memory), (2) they demonstrate
a stable and reproducible dynamics that is sensitive to the
informational signals; and (3) their dynamics is transient and
evolves via metastable states. Based on these principles, we
introduce a dynamical model of interaction of modes that we label
as emotional and cognitive. The model has a form of coupled
generalized Lotka-Volterra kinetic equations and has demonstrat-
ed a spectrum of qualitatively different activity patterns and
bifurcations depending on the value of a moderate number of
control parameters. We wish to examine the dynamical structures
that emerge when coupling cognitive and emotional modes, and
relate them tentatively to brain activity in normal and pathological
states (see, for example, [25,26]).
The paper is organized as follows: first, we introduce a
canonical model for emotion- cognition mode interaction based
on the above-mentioned main principles. Then we analyze its
dynamical features and the corresponding dynamical objects in
phase space which correlate with specific types of mental activities
in healthy and disordered brains. We will illustrate the model
abilities on examples: the spontaneous ‘‘resting-state’’ dynamics
characterized by low-frequency pulsations, and the dynamics of
anxiety disorders, such as panic attack and obsessive-compulsive
disorder (OCD). We also analyze a ‘‘cognitive performance –
arousal’’ interaction focusing on a hysteresis phenomenon.
Materials and Methods
Mental Modes: Dynamical Variables and Phase Space
Numerous attempts have been made to quantify cognition, i.e.,
problem solving by information processing, and emotion, i.e.,
spontaneous motivation and subsequent implementation of a
behavior. Being directly related to the processing of auxiliary
information, cognition has attracted relatively more attention
compared to emotion in these efforts, particularly in the form of
decision-making tasks [27,28]. Although several tests aiming to
assess emotions exist (see, for example, [29]), these have often been
confounded by concomitant cognitive processes, such as appraisal
[30,31], decision making [32], or memory [33,34].
Which variables we needed to describe the evolution of the
emotional and cognitive modes while capturing their functional
complexity? To answer this question, we look at an example of
complex systems in non-living nature, such as turbulent flows [35].
A macroscopic description of turbulence can be made using
equations for coarse-grain liquid particles; the micro details of the
molecular dynamics are irrelevant. Of course, these micro details
are important because they determine the parameters of the
macroscopic model. However, the basic coarse-grain equations are
much simpler and transparent. Although the situation regarding
mental dynamics is much more complex, we can still apply the
turbulent flow analogy. Using this approach, a neural mass
model has been suggested for the simulation of cortical activity
[36–38]. Our approach – based on mental mode interaction - is
also coarse-grain.
The dynamical variables, i.e., the amplitude of the different
mental modes describing emotion, cognition, and mental resourc-
es consumed by them, form a joint state space (or phase space). We
assume that a specific cognitive activity (e.g., appraisal or
sequential navigation) can be described by the interaction of a
finite number (N) of cognitive modes and that such interaction is
both reproducible and distinguishable over time. Thus, a spatio-
temporal movie of such cognitive activity can be captured, for
example, by a series of functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI) snapshots taken at consecutive times while the subject
engages in a specific cognitive task. There are several efficient ways
to extract the modes from the experimental data, e.g., by principal
or independent components analyses of temporal brain activity
[39–41]. Thus, the cognitive activity at time t can be represented
as
P N
i~0
Ai t ðÞ Ui k ðÞ , where Ui(k) is a function that characterizes the
averaged relative activities of k participants of a distributed
Figure 1. Heteroclinic chain. (Left panel) The simplest sequence of two metastable states (i.e., saddles), where the unstable separatrix of the first
saddle is owned by the stable separatrix of the second. (Right panel) The sequence can be (structurally) stable, i.e., attractive for any point in its
vicinity marked by the dark stripe.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012547.g001
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level of activity of this mode at time t. Some of the cognitive
modes, can be responsible for the interaction with emotion, for
example, arousal and generation of any given coping strategy (see
also [42]). The number N of these modes depends on the level of
details that we wish to describe. Emotional activity can be
represented in the same way -
P M
j~0
Bj t ðÞ Vj l ðÞ , where Bj(t) are
dynamical variables and Vj(l) is a function that characterizes the
structure of the j-th emotional mode. The ensemble of emotional
modes includes both positive and negative emotions in our model.
Resources are represented in a similar manner.
A Canonical Model of the Mental Dynamics
In the last few years, the nonlinear dynamical theory has
formulated the concept of stable transients that are robust against
noise, yet sensitive to the external signal [12,24]. The mathemat-
ical object that corresponds to such stable transients is a sequence
of the metastable states that are connected by special trajectories
named separatrices (see Fig. 1). Under proper conditions (as
outlined in the Appendix), all trajectories in the neighborhood of
the metastable states that form the chain remain in their vicinity,
ensuring robustness and reproducibility in a wide range of the
control parameters. Because such sequence is possibly the only
dynamical object that satisfies the dynamical principles that were
formulated above, we assume that from the dynamical point of
view, mental activity is also a sequence of the metastable states.
The following is the formulation of the desired features of the
model: the model must be dissipative with an unstable trivial state
(origin) in the phase space and the corresponding linear
increments must be stabilized by the nonlinear terms organized
by self- and mutual-inhibition (mode competition); the phase space
of the system must include the metastable states that represent the
activity of an individual mode when other modes are passive; and
finally these metastable states must be connected by separatrices to
build a sequence. Well-known rate models in neuroscience satisfy
these conditions in some regions of the control parameter space
[43,44]. Thus, the canonical model describing the mode dynamics
employs the nonlinear rate equations:
tAi
d
dt
Ai t ðÞ ~Ai t ðÞ :Fi A,B,R,S ðÞ
tBi
d
dt
Bi t ðÞ ~Bi t ðÞ :Wi A,B,R,S ðÞ
hi
d
dt
Ri t ðÞ ~Ri t ðÞ :Qi A,B,R,S ðÞ
ð1Þ
where Ai$0, i=1,…,N, represents the cognitive modes, Bi,
i=1,…,M, represents the emotional modes and Ri, i=1,…,K,
represents the resources consumed by these mental processes. Fi,
Wi, and Qi are functions of Ai, Bi, and Ri, respectively. The
collections of N cognitive modes, M emotional modes, and K
resource items are encapsulated in A, B, and R, respectively.
When initiated properly, this set of equations ensures that all the
variables remain non-negative. The vector S represents the
external or/and internal inputs to the system and tA, tB, and h
are the time constants.
First, let us apply the model (1) to just one form of the mental
activity when cognition-emotion interaction is negligible. Let us
imagine a situation where cognition changes over time while
emotion remains more or less constant over time. Keeping in mind
that the competition between the different modes of cognitive
activity can be described in the simplest form of functions on the
right side of equation (1), i.e., F(A,S) being linear, we can present
the first set of equations (1) in a standard form of a generalized
Lotka-Volterra (GLV) model [45]:
tA
d
dt
Ai~Ai mi S ðÞ {
X N
j~1
rijAjzg t ðÞ
"#
ð2Þ
Here mi(S) is the increment that represents both intrinsic and
external excitation, rij is the competition matrix between the
cognitive modes, g(t) is a multiplicative noise perturbing the
system, S is the input that captures the sources of internal or
external effects on the increment. A similar model can describe the
competition between the emotional modes when cognition does
not influence the emotion.
The model (2) has many remarkable features, which we will use
to build and understand the canonical model; depending on the
control parameters, it can describe a vast array of mental
behaviors. In particular, when connections are nearly symmetric,
i.e., rij<rji, two or more stable states can co-exist, yielding multi-
stable dynamics where the initial condition determines the final
state. When the connections are strongly non-symmetric, a stable
sequence of the metastable states can emerge [12] (see Fig. 1). The
non-symmetric inhibitory interaction between the modes helps to
solve an apparent paradox related to the notion that sensitivity and
reliability in a network can coexist: the joint action of the external
input and a stimulus-dependent connectivity matrix defines the
stimulus-specific sequence. Dynamical chaos can also be observed
in this case [46]. Furthermore, a specific kind of the dynamical
chaos, where the order of the switching is deterministic, but the
lifetime of the metastable states is random, is possible [47]. Similar
‘‘timing chaos with serial order’’ has been observed in vivo in the
gustatory cortex [23].
For the model (2), the area in the control parameter space with a
structural stability of the transients has been formulated in [12]
(see the Appendix in File S1).
Describing the interaction between the cognitive modes,
emotional modes, and the resources consumed by these mental
processes, we are particularly interested in a structurally stable
transient mental activity, which can effectively describe the
reproducible activation patterns during normal mental states and
identify specific instabilities that correspond to mental disorders.
Based on the GLV model (2), we introduce the system (1) as
follows:
tAi
d
dt
Ai t ðÞ ~Ai t ðÞ : si S,B,RA ðÞ {
X N
j~1
rijAj t ðÞ
"#
zAi t ðÞ gA t ðÞ ,
i~1,...,N
ð3Þ
tBi
d
dt
Bi t ðÞ ~Bi t ðÞ : fi S,B,RB ðÞ {
X M
j~1
jijBj t ðÞ
"#
zBi t ðÞ gB t ðÞ ,
i~1,...,M
ð4Þ
h
i
A
d
dt
Ri
A t ðÞ ~Ri
A t ðÞ :
X N
j~1
Aj t ðÞ {
X KA
m~1
Rm
A{wA
X KB
m~1
Rm
BzdA t ðÞ
"#
,
i~1,...,KA
ð5Þ
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i
B
d
dt
Ri
B t ðÞ ~Ri
B t ðÞ :
X M
j~1
Bj t ðÞ {
X KB
m~1
Rm
B{wB
X KA
m~1
Rm
AzdB t ðÞ
"#
,
i~1,...,KB
ð6Þ
The proposed model (3)–(6) reflects a mutual inhibition and
excitation within and among these three sets of modes (see
Table 1). These modes depend on the inputs through parameter S
(that may represent, for example, stress, cognitive load, physical
state of the body). The variables R
i
A and R
i
B characterize the KA
and KB resource items that are allocated to cognition and emotion,
respectively. The vectors RA and RB are the collections of these
items that gate the increments of the cognitive and emotional
modes in competition. The characteristic times h of the different
resources may vary. The coefficients wA and wB determine the level
of competition between cognition and emotion for these resources.
Each process is open to the multiplicative noise denoted by g and d
terms in the equations.
The values of the increments si and fi depend on the stimuli
and/or the intensity of the emotional and cognitive modes,
respectively. The only design constraint that we can impose on the
increments si and fi is that they must stay positive.
Three types of interactions are described by the model (3)–(6): (i)
a competitive interaction within each set of modes; (ii) the
interaction through excitation (increments); and (iii) the competi-
tion for resources. For the latter, which occurs via variables RA and
RB, one only needs a proper selection of the parameters wA and wB.
Despite the computational simplicity in their selection, they appear
to be highly individual- and task-specific. The time constants are
the decisive parameters of the model and should be determined ad
hoc experimentally. The values of the control parameters of the
model, which ensure stability of the transients (for normal
behavior), can be obtained from the inequalities that describe
the ratio between compressing and stretching of the phase volume
in the vicinity of the metastable states [12]. The effective number
of the parameters can be much smaller than that listed in the
model.
The brain imaging data available today does not reveal the
detailed structure of the modes and values of parameters, most
importantly, the connectivity matrix to specify the model for
different mental functions and disorders; therefore, a complete
theoretical description and prediction is not possible today. In spite
of this, the model has a large dynamical repertoire and has just
enough number of parameters to demonstrate possible behaviors
and transitions among them, i.e., bifurcations. This capability,
together with demonstrated success in representing some key
phenomena observed in the real brain, is a valuable qualitative
prediction by itself and can be useful for understanding the origin
of observed mental phenomena such as depression, working
memory, and decision making in a changing environment [48,49].
The dynamical objects in the phase space of the model
representing mental processes are influenced by the intrinsic brain
dynamics and by the external stimuli. For example, during
sequential decision-making, sequential working memory or
navigation, the image of the cognitive dynamics is a stable
transient, while other common cognitive activities, such as those
pertaining to music [50] or linguistic functions [51] can be
represented by the recurrent dynamics. Emotion can also
demonstrate a whole range of the dynamical behaviors: transient
regimes similar to cognitive ones, recurrent regular or irregular
recurrence dynamics corresponding to mood changes; and long
lasting equilibria associated with clinical cases of deep depression
or constant excitement.
Results
Modulation Instability: possible dynamical origin of low-
frequency resting-state oscillations
Let us first analyze spontaneous mental dynamics in a stationary
environment where the brain is not engaged in a particular
cognitive function, i.e., resting-state brain dynamics. Such resting
state is related to the dynamics of the Default-Mode Network
(DMN), which is a set of specific brain regions whose activity is
predominant during the resting state [52]. We have chosen the
control parameters of the model (3)–(6) in the area of the control
parameter space where the basic dynamics of both cognitive and
emotional modes demonstrate simple rhythmic activity (oscilla-
tions with a characteristic time scale of 2–3 sec). Such ‘‘indepen-
dent’’ emotional and cognitive activity has been observed during
weak competition. When competition becomes larger than the
critical value, this simple rhythmic activity becomes unstable due
to modulation instability, thereby a stable limit cycle appears on
the phase plane of the mean activity: ~ A At ðÞ ~
1
N
X N
i~1
Ai and
~ B Bt ðÞ ~
1
M
X M
i~1
Bi. This modulation instability leads to stable Low
Frequency Oscillations (LFO), as shown in Fig. 2 (see also [53]).
Table 1. Model parameters and their values used the simulations.
Parameter Role Range of values in simulations
tAi Time constants for cognitive modes 1e-2 to1e-1
tBi Time constants for cognitive modes 1e-2 to 1e-1
h
i
A, h
i
B Time constants for resource dynamics 1
r, j Competition matrices – inducing metastable state sequence Selected according to the inequalities in Appendix, assuming all increment values
equal unity
si Increments to the cognition modes – locating the metastable
states
Dependent variable within 0 and 1: proportional to exogenous input S, inversely
proportional to either a specific emotion mode, or the total emotional activity, i.e.,
S Bi
fi Increments to the emotion modes Dependent variable within 0 and 1: either a constant of 1 or inversely proportional
to S Ai
gA,gB, dA, dB Noise components Uniform random terms within 0 and u, where u is set between 1e-6 and 1e-3
wA,wB Regulate the resource modes competition Constants set to 1, except in hysteresis simulation, where wA =0.33 and wB =1.0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012547.t001
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robust modulation process is close to the quasi-periodic LFO.
An increasing number of EEG and resting state fMRI studies in
both humans and animals indicate that spontaneous low frequency
fluctuations in cerebral activity at 0.01–0.1 Hz represent a
fundamental component of brain functioning. In particular,
resting state fMRI measures show stable properties of LFO (see
Fig. 2), the nature of which are only beginning to be uncovered
and have produced a lot of debates. Observed LFO in fMRI, for
instance, could simply be due to the band-pass filtering effect of the
hemodynamic response function. In general, the LFO fluctuations
observed with fMRI are not the same as the underlying neuronal
fluctuations because they have been passed through a hemody-
namic response function. However, some data [54–57] supports
the hypothesis that LFO are correlated with the network’s activity,
i.e. modes cooperative dynamics (e.g. due to their modulation or
synchronization). The modulation instability that we have
observed in the computer experiments discloses a plausible
dynamical origin of low frequency mental mode dynamics in the
resting states, possibly related to the ‘‘cortical-subcortical cross-
talk’’ [58]. Importantly, discovering changes in the resting state
dynamics in various psychiatric disorders may provide a new tool
for the diagnosis of psychopathology or for identifying individual
variations in physiological arousal [59–62].
Psychopathology and Emotional Instability
Let us consider anxiety disorders that have been associated with
abnormal activity in distinct brain networks or modes including
hippocampus anterior cingualte, insula, basal ganglia, and some
others [63,64]. Although there is large symptomatic overlap
between different anxiety disorders, each disorder can be
characterized by a specific quality of anxiety dynamics, i.e.,
specific emotional instability, and, thus, can be represented by its
own dynamical object in the phase space of the canonical model
with appropriate value of the control parameters.
Below we will explain a possible dynamical description for panic
attack and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD). From the
dynamical theory point of view, normal emotion- and cognition-
related activities occur between pathological but stable states (like
deep depression, coma, etc.) and ‘‘the edge of chaos’’ which is also
a pathological. Psychopathology, like panic attack and OCD, is
associated with irregular dynamical behavior and is often more
consistent with chaotic dynamics (see, for example [65–68]).
Mathematical images of such dynamics are transient chaos or
strange attractors [69].
Panic attacks occur in many different types of anxiety disorders.
They have a sudden onset and typically peak within 10 minutes.
There are several interesting views and models of panic attack in
the literature [70,71]. In particular, Callahan and Sashi [71] have
Figure 2. Anti-phase Low-Frequency Oscillation of mental activity. In the resting state, it is a result of two groups of default modes
competition – modulational instability (S is constant, N=M=5 in the model (3)–(6)). The black envelope on the middle plot is the total cognitive
activity as predicted by the model. Its competition with the emotion modes (top row) results in a pulsation as observed in many EEG and fMRI
studies. The bottom figure, reconstructed based on the data presented in [53], shows one such observation in the brain’s resting state.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012547.g002
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which represents some qualitative characteristics of pathologic
affective response. While such perspectives are useful for the
integration of biophysical formulations of the interaction between
the biology and social experience [72], our view is that any
description of emotion as a stand-alone phenomenon, isolated
from other players of mentality, would be limited in utility.
Based on equations (3)–(6), we modeled the interaction of modes
that can be related to panic attack with modes of sequential
cognitive activity (- e.g., sequential decision-making). When the
interactioncognitionwithemotionisnegligiblysmall,thedynamical
object representing such cognitive activity in the phase space is a
robust periodic or quasi-periodic sequence of the metastable states.
The model reproduces this activity when the (s,r) pair satisfies
certainstability conditions (seeAppendix)to constructa stable chain
of metastable states in the cognitive subspace of the joint phase
space. Suppose now that the interaction function s(B)i sn o n -
monotonic and large for some B components, and the resource
competition is mild (i.e., wA and wB are small). As can be seen in
Fig. 3, the dynamical object corresponding to the temporal
interaction between emotion and cognition during a panic attack
is transient chaos, i.e., both the cognitive activity and the emotion
become unpredictable for a finite time (see the time series in Fig. 3).
Such chaotic mental activity can be quantitatively characterized by
the maximal transient Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy, which is
approximately 0.34 (during the panic attack period) in our example.
The OCD is a type of an anxiety disorder that traps people in
the endless cycles of repetitive feelings, unwanted thoughts and
unwanted repetitive acts which the sufferer realizes are undesirable
but is unable to resist – compulsive rituals [73,74]. The compulsive
rituals characteristic of OCD are performed in an attempt to
prevent the obsessive thoughts or make them go away. Although
the ritualistic behavior may make the anxiety go away temporarily,
the person must perform the ritualistic behavior again when the
obsessive thoughts return. People with OCD may be aware that
their obsessions and compulsions are senseless or unrealistic, but
they cannot stop themselves. An attractor-based description of the
OCD has been attempted recently in [75].
To model OCD, we introduce a sequence of saddles – that is,
metastable states, in the cognitive subspace. Each saddle in this
Figure 3. A simulation of a panic disorder on the emotional or the cognitive mode evolution. The panic attack arises due to an external
disturbance (represented as an instantaneous kick marked by a red ticker in the inset above) at time t=1000s. The attack is characterized by an
irregularity in both the cognition and the emotion dynamics. The magnitudes (thus, the switching order) of each group of modes are non-
deterministic during this period. In this example, the system returns to its regular pace after some period (i.e., t.10,000 s). The top row shows an early
phase of the irregular activity due to the attack both in time and in a phase portrait. The situation after turning to ‘‘normal’’ is shown on the bottom
row.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012547.g003
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tion, as described in the Appendix. One of these dimensions forms
the separatrix leading to the next cognitive metastable state along
a cognitive sequence, whereas the second unstable separatrix
targets the emotional saddle that represents the entry to the ritual,
which is modeled as a different stable chain of the ‘‘emotional’’
metastable states. The ritual terminates at a saddle that has many
unstable separatrices, each yielding to a cognitive mode (see Fig. 4).
As a result, the OCD dynamics is represented by a (N+M)–
dimensional transient, which qualitatively distinguishes itself from
the normal behavior and from other disorders characterized by a
specific instability that leads to uncertainty. The result of modeling
predicts that in OCD the interaction of the sequential cognitive
activity (e.g., sequential decision making), with emotion is
characterized by intermittent dynamical instability. The corre-
sponding dynamical images and phase portraits are represented in
Fig. 4.
The OCD model includes enough parameters to describe the
competition between the cognitive process and the ritual in great
detail. It is possible to make the model ‘non-circular’ by arranging
the unstable separatrices of the terminal ritual mode. This
adjustment, however, requires clinical data that reveal the return
to the cognitive function from the ritual (see also [76]). As one can
observe from Figs. 3 and 4, both a panic attack and the OCD have
nondeterministic components. However, the mechanisms of the
chaotic behavior in these cases are different: the dynamical object
that represents the emotion-cognition interaction during a panic
attack is transient chaos, whereas a very specific object, which we
name ‘‘intermittent transient’’, describes the emotion-cognition
interaction in OCD. Along such an intermittent transient, a chain
of metastable cognitive modes is interrupted by the ritualistic
behavior characteristic of OCD with an unpredictable returning.
‘‘Cognitive performance – arousal’’ interaction. Hysteresis
It is well known that emotions can suddenly switch cognition
from one regime to another. Let us use the model (3)–(6) for the
analysis of such a phenomenon, i.e., the dependence of cognitive
performance on the level of arousal. The popular point of view is
Figure 4. Dynamical representation of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). (Top Left) The proposed dynamical image of the OCD. Here,
while the cognitive task evolves on stable transients, the dynamics shift towards a dominant intermittent transient sequence (i.e., the ritual) whose
initial mode lies on the unstable manifolds of the cognitive saddles. During this ritual, the cognition halts and upon its completion the individual
returns to the cognitive process, not necessarily through the last cognitive mode visited. (Bottom) A simulation of OCD by the proposed model. Here
the individual performs a ‘‘normal’’ cognitive task represented by the five modes colored yellow-to-red. At certain periods, the individual performs a
ritual as illustrated by four dark-colored modes in a prescribed ordered. The system can enter this ritual sequence from any cognitive mode, and,
upon completion of the ritual, returns back to the cognitive process via an arbitrary mode. (Top right) A phase portrait of this dynamical behavior.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012547.g004
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stressor: the performance improves with physiological or mental
arousal, but only up to a point; when levels of arousal become too
high, performance decreases. The process is often illustrated
graphically as an inverted U-shaped curve. Despite its plausibility,
the Yerkes-Dodson law is difficult to test empirically (see, for
example, [77]). Usually the ‘‘inverted-U’’ behavior is realistic
enough when the cognitive anxiety is low, i.e., when the human is
not worried. Since we are interested in the emotion-cognition
interaction, we focus on comparing the model’s prediction with
previously reported experiments in the case when physiological
arousal interacts with cognitive anxiety, i.e. the human is worried
to influence his/her performance.
To the best of our knowledge, currently there is no dynamical
model capable of describing an emotion-cognitive hysteresis (see
Fig. 5b). Hysteresis phenomenon is well known among sociologists
and sport psychologists [78]. To explain it we need to estimate
regions or attraction of two equilibria A9 and B9. Two levels of
arousal, where one region (domain) of attraction becomes much
larger than the other one and vice versa, determine the hysteresis
loop. Our analysis is based on the fact that dynamics of the
average levels of emotional and cognitive activities largely
coincides with the dynamics of available mental resources
(represented by variables RA and RB in the model, respectively).
The phase portraits of the system in the phase plane (RA, RB) are
shown in Fig. 5a. One can observe that the area of attraction of
state A9 dominates under low arousal levels. As arousal increases,
the areas of attraction A9 and B9 become comparable, thus
manifesting the bistability - further increase in arousal level results
in a ‘‘monostable’’ condition A9=0. Since the system ‘‘remem-
bers’’ the initial conditions, the decreasing level of arousal will lead
to equilibrium (calm state of mind) only when the area of
attraction A9 greatly exceeds area of attraction B9.
Discussion
In conclusion, we have seen that the suggested coarse-grain
model based on the formulated principles is potentially very
powerful. This model operates on the activities of correlated
neuronal groups distributed in the brain, abstractly termed mental
modes. In principle, it is possible to describe the anatomical
structure of many cognitive and emotion modes, based on imaging
data that are available today. However, from the practical point of
view, at neuronal level it still may not be helpful to make a direct
connection of our phenomenological model with neurobiology.
This is because it is currently impossible to determine the
functional connections between different modes. Thus, at just
glance, our approach (based on the observation of behavioral
transformations) seems like the only reasonable one presently. A
key object in the model dynamics is a stable transient realized
through a reproducible serial order of metastable states. As a
generic dynamical phenomenon, which is rare in simple systems
yet common in complex ones, the sequential switching among
metasable states can provide concise and constructive formulations
in a variety of mental problems [79]. The prototype dynamical
models are widely accepted in neuroscience [80]. The key
physiological mechanism underlying the winnerless competition
(WLC) and sequential switching in the brain is nonsymmetric
inhibition, which is known to exist in neural systems from micro-
to macroscopic levels [81–85]. WLC is observed in biological
systems, in particular, in two in vivo experiments, e.g., gustatory
and olfactory sensory systems [23,86,87].
Figure 5. Hysteresis relation between cognitive performance and arousal. (a) The cognitive performance and arousal can have a hysteresis
relation. The mechanism responsible from this relation is the indirect (resources) competition among the RA and RB variables as introduced in the
model. A sequence of phase portraits that corresponds to decreasing stressor (arousal) intensity is shown on the left panel. The attractors are
indicated by A9 and B9. Panel (b) illustrates the hysteresis relation observed in the proposed model. The model can successfully reproduce this
disorder when (s,r) and (f,j) pairs satisfy SHC conditions; s(B) and f (A,S) are non-smooth and large for some A, B; f(A,S) increases with S; and the
resource competition is strong with QA?QB.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012547.g005
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model of a real system that undergoes a time evolution from the
initial moment to infinity. The cortex, strictly speaking, is not a
dynamical system under this definition. However, many mental
functions demonstrate dynamical features and can be described by
appropriate dynamical models over finite intervals of time.
Furthermore, the brain is somehow capable of coordinating the
results of interrupted dynamical activities as a ‘‘sequence of
sequences’’ (see also [88]). One can hypothesize that, in such cases,
mental modes coordinate their activities in accordance with the
universal principles that we have already discussed in this paper.
To handle the uncertainty that is typical for the interrupted
sequences one needs additional principles - presumably the
minimum predictive error, the minimum information principle
[89], or the free energy principle [90].
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